INTRODUCTION 24
What enables corporate entrepreneurship in emerging economy SMEs? Corporate 25 Entrepreneurship (CE) has attracted scholarly interest because it directs firms to recognize and exploit 26 new opportunities (Ireland, Covin, and Kuratko 2009 ) through innovative and proactive behavior (Dess, 27 Lumpkin, and McGee 1999) that can revitalize and increase the innovativeness of existing organizations 28 (Covin and Miles 2007; Ireland et al. 2009; Zahra, Jennings, and Kuratko 1999) . Corporate 29 entrepreneurship is necessary for firms in turbulent, dynamic or highly volatile environments, wherein 30 strategic flexibility and innovativeness are needed to maintain competitive advantages and respond to 31 environmental pressures (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Obloj 2008; Yiu and Lau 2008) . Emerging economies 32 represent such a context but are characterized by competitive, market and institutional differences that 33 condition how managers and employees make judgments about CE and perceive what conditions and 34 actions are legitimate within their context Hermelo and Vassolo 2010; Wan 35 and Hoskisson 2003; Yiu and Lau 2008) . Because of these crucial differences, the failure of CE research 36 to properly treat the context firms exist and operate in means that the present consensus among scholars 37 Guerrero 2013b; Phan, Wright, Ucbasaran, and Tan 2009). A new group of studies have since called for 48
an examination of what enables firms to achieve CE in emerging economy contexts (Hornsby et al. 49 2013b; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and Wright 2000) . An emerging economy context holds very different 50 institutional characteristics compared to the traditional Western origin of CE studies. For example, a 51 collectivist culture, authoritarianism, and deference to authority prevalent in African nations can shape 52 indifference toward entrepreneurship among African employees (Jackson, Kenneth, and Serap 2008; 53 Morris, Davis, and Allen 1994; van Wyk and Adonisi 2012) . Institutional differences and institution-54 specific conditions can also directly affect strategic choices available at the level of the emerging 55 economy firm (Young, Tsai, Wang, Liu, and Ahlstrom 2014) . It is far from certain that the antecedents of 56 CE conceived in the tradition of mid-to-large-sized established firms in Western economies transfer to 57 different economic and institutional contexts. 58
In addition to the institutional context, studies must also account for SMEs as a new generation 59 of research shows that SMEs operate differently to their established, larger counterparts in terms of 60 entrepreneurship (Kraus 2011; Zellweger and Sieger 2012) and do not readily fit models built from 61 research into such firms (Sine, Mitsuhashi, and Kirsch 2006) . Sine et al. (2006) 
lament the false logic that 62
SMEs rely on flexibility and a lack of formalization for their success, arguing that these initial conditions 63
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 116

THE INTERNAL ANTECEDENTS FOR CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 117
Defined as a "process wherein an individual or a group of individuals, in association with an 118 existing organization, create a new organization or instigate renewal or innovation within that 119
organization" (Sharma and Chrisman 1999: p.26) , CE broadly describes activities related to the 120 development and pursuit of new business ideas and opportunities within established firms. This definition 121 builds on earlier statements by Guth and Ginsberg (1990) that CE encompasses new corporate venturing 122 and strategic renewal. Later work by Morris, Kuratko and Covin (2011) added a third dimension in the 123 form of strategic entrepreneurship, in which a firm favors, pursues, and implements high-impact 124 innovation. It is the internal environment of the firm that originates, enables, and incubates CE activities 125 that may go on to represent these larger outcomes (Hornsby et al. 2013a) . Although various definitions of 126 CE exist, we adopt Sharma and Chrisman's (1999) definition, as it is sufficiently broad to avoid 127 excluding important issues that may otherwise go undetected. This is also appropriate given that what 128 constitutes CE and its outcomes in emerging economy and service sector SMEs is neither well-known nor 129 well-circumscribed as yet (Kraus 2011) . 130
Firms that exhibit CE are typically viewed as dynamic, flexible entities prepared to take 131 advantage of new business opportunities as they appear (Kuratko, Goldsby and Hornsby 2012) . Firms 132 also stand to gain improvements in business performance from CE with longstanding longitudinal 133 evidence anchoring this belief (Zahra and Covin 1995) . Uncontrollable factors such as environmental 134 hostility and rapid technological advancement may push entrepreneurial activity to take place inside an 135 organization (Bradley, Aldrich, Shepherd, and Wiklund 2011) , because successfully competing in such 136 environments requires a strategic intent towards entrepreneurial activity (Ireland et al. 2009; Morris et al. 137 2011) . Such a strategic intent can be achieved through purposeful managerial actions to create a pro-CE 138 organizational architecture (Hornsby et al. 2013a; Ireland et al. 2009 ). Assessing and determining a firm's 139 current organizational environment or state of 'organizational preparedness for CE' represents an 140 important element for successfully implementing a CE strategy (Hornsby et al. 2013a, p.937) . 141 CE in general) (de Villiers-Scheepers 2012; Hornsby et al. 2009; Sebora et al. 2010) and theoretical 168 assumptions which are based on the experiences of larger firms from developed economies such as the 169 U.S. (Hornsby et al. 2002; Rutherford and Holt 2007) and Canada (Hornsby, Kuratko and Montagno 170 1999) . Therefore, rather than being a simple function of the five 'established' antecedents, further 171 differences in the makeup of those dimensions and in their influence on enabling CE may come from 172 contextual differences among different types of firms in different types of economies. Cause for concern 173 also comes from studies into SMEs. In examining the CEAI measure in the context of a knowledge-174 intensive European SMEs, Christensen (2005) noted that the five existing antecedents were not sufficient 175 in enabling entrepreneurship in such contexts. Differences across cultural norms and values may further 176 yield differences in the patterns and conceptualizations of the existing CEAI dimensions (de Villiers-177 Scheepers 2012; Hornsby et al. 2013b) . 178
Outside of the CEAI measure itself and looking at the effects of entrepreneurial orientation, 179 Frank, Kessler, and Fink (2010) reported that a positive connection between firm entrepreneurial behavior 180 and business performance only occurred in cases in which a dynamic environment is combined with high 181 access to financial capital and when a stable environment is combined with low access to financial 182 capital. The findings of Frank et al. (2010) stand in contrast to existing observations about SMEs in 183 emerging economies. For example, despite growing competition and complex operating environments 184 (i.e., a dynamic environment), and limited access to and availability of resources (including financial), 185 many emerging economy SMEs remain vibrant, innovative and successful, suggesting that CE is rife 186 among them (Jackson et al. 2008) . For these reasons, the paper now moves to analyze the potential 187 antecedents of CE in the context of emerging economy SMEs, and Kenya in particular. 188
189
ANTECEDENTS TO CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN EMERGING ECONOMY SMEs 190
The benefits and value of CE are not restricted to large established firms from developed market 191 economies (Hitt, Ireland, Sirmon and Trahms 2011) . CE also holds promise for SMEs in emerging 192 economy contexts (Gómez-Haro, Aragón-Correa, and Cordón-Pozo 2011; Lou and Junkunc 2008) as it 193 offers a means through which emerging economy SMEs can (re)vitalize activities, reconfigure resources, 194 and set in place the entrepreneurial mindsets indispensable to competing effectively in such highly 195 turbulent environments (de Villiers-Schemers 2012; Yiu and Lau 2008) . But the body of knowledge on 196 how CE is enabled in such firms in such contexts remains thin (Phan et al. 2009 ). 197 Vossen (1998 suggested that the main advantage of SMEs over larger firms is their 198 entrepreneurial behavior. If so, the organizational antecedents that encourage and support CE might then 199 be valid across firms of any size. However, unlike their larger counterparts, SMEs compete in competitive 200 markets with only limited resources (Carrier 1996; Zahra and Pearce 1994) and exhibit different internal 201 organizational challenges brought about by growth. Such challenges may impact how support for CE is 202 organized in SMEs. For example, Sebora et al. (2010) only found the CEAI dimensions of management 203 support and rewards (through recognition) to be significantly related to improving CE in Thai SMEs; 204 owner/manager leadership style (Kantur and Iseri-Say 2013) and the nature of their personal relationships 205 with employees have been suggested as more important determinants of CE among SMEs 206 (Castrogiovanni, Urbano, and Loras 2011); and Sine et al. (2006) found the classic Burns and Stalker 207 view that firms, irrespective of size, benefit from an 'organic' structure in dynamic environments to be 208 misleading for young and small firms. 209
Recent empirical evidence suggests that the emerging economy context matters for employees' 210 perceptions of the internal environment for CE (de Villiers-Scheepers 2012; van Wyk and Adonisi 2012) . 211 This can be explained by institutional theory, and prior research has shown that the institutional 212 environment can affect the nature and scope of entrepreneurial activities among firms 213 Gómez-Haro et al. 2011; Ireland et al. 2009 ). Institutions refer to the cognitive, normative, and regulative 214 structures that provide stability and meaning to behavior (Scott 1995) . Institutions can be formal 215 (regulations, normative, contracts, etc.) or informal (codes of conduct, attitudes, values, etc.), but informal 216 institutions are particularly important in that they also provide behavioral short cuts for individuals and 217 organizations as they 'come from socially transmitted information and are a part of the heritage that we 218 call culture' (North 1990, p.37 ). An institutional perspective on CE proposes that the behaviors exhibited 219 by firms, and the decisions made by their managers and employees, are shaped by formal and informal 220 institutional arrangements (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010; Gómez-Haro et al. 2011; Hoskisson et al. 221 2000; Ireland et al. 2009; Puffer, McCarthy, and Boisot 2010) . Thus, how the CEAI dimensions are 222 perceived by individuals and how CE is enacted in response to those institutional arrangements can be 223 expected to differ between SMEs in emerging and developed economies (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010; 224 Yiu and Lau 2008) . 225
Kenya represents a growing emerging economy, wherein local SMEs represent a critical vehicle 226 for employment creation and poverty reduction. Many Kenyan SMEs continue to find themselves 227 competing in highly globalized environments, but with limited access to critical resources (Bowen and 228 Mureithi 2009; Mwobobia 2012) . Such resource constraints suggest that Kenyan SMEs are more likely to 229 face proportionately greater risk from innovation failure than larger firms and receive fewer rewards for 230 being entrepreneurial (Sorescu and Spanjol 2003) . Additionally, the availability of financial resources has 231 been shown to influence African SME managers' perceptions of innovation (Freel 2005) , while the 232 quality of human capital (Hausman 2005; Kiggundu 1988 ) has been found to affect the innovative 233 behavior of African SMEs (Blunt and Jones 1992; Jackson et al. 2008) . In short, wider resource 234 constraints may make it difficult for emerging economy SMEs to organize and provide support for 235 entrepreneurial initiatives (Frank et al. 2010) . 236
The service sector accounts for about 63 percent of Kenya's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 237 has historically led Kenya's economic growth (Library of Congress 2007). The limited research into firm-238 level entrepreneurship among service sector firms has tended to re-confirm the benefits of CE for firm 239 performance (Kraus 2011) . Research has also shown service sector SMEs to have significantly higher 240 levels of entrepreneurship than manufacturing firms (Rigtering, Kraus, Eggers, and Jensen 2014) . In 241 Kenya, manufacturing accounts for as little as 14 percent of GDP (Library of Congress 2007). Scholars 242 have suggested that the specific characteristics of service sector firms such as the intangibility of their 243 products (Bateson 1992) and their simultaneous production and consumption (Lovelock 1984) , make 244 service sector firms more labor-and less capital-intensive than manufacturing sector firms. This suggests 245 that the service sector context might further influence the antecedents of CE in these firms (Kraus 2011) . 246
Differences in normative and cognitive factors within the institutional context and challenges 247 faced SMEs within the service sector context are likely to shape managers' and employees' perceptions of 248 CE and the CEAI dimensions (Morris et al. 1994 ). For example, Hornsby et al. (2009) and Carrier (1996) 249 suggest that effective reward systems should emphasize individual responsibility and provide results-250 based incentives to spur entrepreneurial activity. However, such assumptions many not hold true in 251 emerging contexts such as Kenya, in which collectivist principles often dominate. A strongly collectivist 252 environment may give rise to an anti-entrepreneurial bias, wherein group performance and reward 253 systems can encourage 'free-rider' or 'social loafing' syndromes (Jackson et al. 2008; Morris et al. 1994) . 254
Moreover, Monsen, Patzelt and Saxton (2010) reported a complex interaction among perceived 255 employment risk, profit sharing, and the extra effort employees are willing to exert when participating in 256 new initiatives. With respect to Kenya, Blunt and Jones (1986) found that managers assigned the highest 257 importance to security needs. Therefore reward systems which emphasize individual responsibility and 258 results-based incentives (as seen in present CE antecedents) (Fry 1987; Sathe 1985) may have little effect 259 in spurring CE in such contexts. 260 Hornsby et al. (2002) and Lumpkin and Dess (1996) also proposed that work discretion and 261 autonomy are needed to encourage entrepreneurial endeavor by individuals within firms. This however 262 assumes that individuals are mindful to adopt such practices. Kiggundu (1988) and others noted that 263 management philosophies in Kenya are dominated by principles of classical management, in which there 264 are sharp distinctions and status differences between management and workers. As such Kenyan 265 employees are expected to do their work and obey management's instructions and directives (Beugré and 266 Offodile 2001; Jackson et al. 2008; Kamoche 2011) . Unsurprisingly, in their study of the CEAI 267 dimensions in South Africa, van Wyk and Adonisi (2012) found that such authoritarianism correlated 268 negatively with CE. Thus, differences in cultural attitudes are likely to affect how work discretion is 269 interpreted by subordinates and ultimately practiced by superiors. 270
Time availability for managers is seen as an important resource for generating entrepreneurial 271 outcomes (Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1994) . While CE authors (e.g., Kuratko et al. 2005 ) may argue that 272 in entrepreneurial work environments, employees should be allowed to conduct creative, entrepreneurial 273 experiments during a limited portion of their work time, the reality often falls short of this ideal. This is 274 likely to hold true in the context of emerging economy service sector SMEs, where employees and firms 275 find themselves dealing with fast-paced market changes and dynamic competition along with traditional 276 mindsets towards management (Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010; Jackson et al. 2008; Yiu and Lau 2008) . 277
Slack time for entrepreneurial initiatives among African employees may be meaningless because of 278 cultural preferences towards focusing on immediate tasks with known outcomes coupled with respect 279 towards authority figures (Nyambegera, Sparrow, and Daniels 2000) . Indeed, both de Villiers-Scheepers 280 (2012) and van Wyk and Adonisi (2012) did not find a significant relationship between time availability 281 and CE. 282
In sum, theoretical explanations suggest that differences among CE antecedents are likely to arise 283 in an emerging economy service sector SME context. To investigate whether and how the antecedents 284 might be relevant or not in firms that do not fit the traditional Western prototype, the paper will now 285 move to discuss the research methodology used to investigate these issues. 286
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 287
Hornsby et al. (2002), Wright (2011), and Zahra et al. (1999) highlighted the need for 288 qualitative research to better understand the organizational and cultural context in which firm-level 289 entrepreneurship takes place. We adopted a multiple case study approach in order to achieve our research 290 objectives (Yin 2003) . According to Yin (2003) , 'the case study contributes uniquely to our knowledge of 291 individual, organizational, social, and political phenomena' and 'the distinctive need for case studies 292 arises out of the desire to understand complex social phenomena' (p. 14). The case study method is 293 increasingly used to examine firm-level entrepreneurship (Peltola 2012; Sebora et al. 2010 ) and has 294 recently been used by several studies to examine constructs such as entrepreneurial orientation (Zellweger 295 and Sieger 2012) and the internal antecedents of CE (Christensen 2005; Kantur and Iseri-Say 2013) . This 296 method is well-suited to understanding the antecedents of CE in the context of emerging economy service 297 sector SMEs. 298
In line with our research objectives, we adopted a criterion based purposive sampling strategy 299 (Patton 1990 ). This approach requires that potential case firms be selected based on meeting specific 300 criterion and looks for cases which are information rich. We searched for SMEs in emerging markets with 301 rich entrepreneurial histories as a means of investigating the internal antecedents that drive their CE. 302 Accordingly, we also looked for potential cases that demonstrated a variety of specific CE related 303 initiatives such as corporate venturing, strategic renewal, and product and process innovation since their 304 inception (see Table 1 for specific examples). Drawing on information from Kenyan Institute of 305
Management's Company of the Year Awards database, we specifically looked for firms that meet the 306 following criteria: (1) were of small or medium size, (2) initiated and implemented two or more CE 307 initiatives (regarding the product, service, process or strategic renewal) within the past five years, and (3) 308 were part of the services sector. 309
We chose the Kenyan services sector as the research site for our empirical investigation because 310 it has been described as one of the most entrepreneurially-oriented sectors of the Kenyan economy 311 (Nyanjom and Ong'olo 2012) . Through active government support and through opening up foreign 312 competition, the sector has undergone profound political, economic, and social changes over the past 15 313 years (Balistreri, Rutherford, and Tarr 2009; Nyanjom and Ong'olo 2012) . As such, SMEs in this sector 314 have found themselves making significant adjustments to their business processes and strategies in order 315 to remain competitive, resulting in the emergence of several highly innovative and entrepreneurial firms 316 within the sector. 317
Fourteen CEOs/Owners of potential firms in Nairobi and Mombasa were contacted regarding 318 their participation in the study. After initial discussion with the CEOs/Owners, it was determined that 319 only 6 of the 14 potential cases met all three of our criteria. The final selection of cases was carried out by 320 considering the variety of industries in which the firms operated in, the possibility of accessing the 321 necessary sources of information and in providing contrasting examples. The four cases selected were 322 KeTours, SafePack, InfoComm and GoodSell, and represented various industries within the services 323 sector: Tourism (KeTours), Retail/sales (GoodSell), ICT (InfoComm) and Health & Safety and 324
We assessed the internal antecedents for CE among Kenyan SMEs using a combination of firm 329 behavior and managerial and employee perceptions drawn from both primary and secondary data (Yin 330 1984; 2003; 2014) . Primary data were collected via a series of semi-structured interviews with 3 to 5 331 individuals from each case firm whom had in-depth knowledge concerning the firms' activities and 332 processes. Environmental changes and organizational factors can be perceived differently by 333 managers/owners and employees alike (Hornsby et al. 2009 ). We thereby avoided the danger of key 334 informant bias by asking questions of both managers and employees. All interviews were conducted in 335
English by the lead author and a research assistant, lasted between 45 minutes to 2 hours in length and 336 were audio taped. An interview protocol based around Hornsby et al.'s (2002) Within this schedule, follow-up questions and prompts were used to explore situations where an 344 interviewee reported a lack of evidence for a specific activity, thereby allowing the data collection process 345 to expand towards learning about contextual factors relevant to entrepreneurship within the firm. In 346 addition, interviewees were specifically asked to reflect upon innovative processes and entrepreneurial 347 activities that had taken place in their firms and how these were organized and put into place in support of 348 CE. Secondary data were also collected from company websites and annual reports, and were gathered in 349 order to map out strategic actions relevant to the subject of the study, to describe important contingencies 350 (industry, culture, or environment) relevant to the subject of the study, to document relevant outcomes in 351 this respect, and to accomplish triangulation as put forward by Yin (1984; 2003; 2014) . 352
All interviews were carefully transcribed by one author and a research assistant. Both researchers 353 independently coded the contents of the interviews using pre-existing antecedents developed and 354 identified by Hornsby et al. (2002) . We chose not to use coding software as the semi-structured nature of 355 the interviews allowed for the rapid identification of key constructs under consideration. The independent 356 coding process led to the development of case protocols approximately 24 pages in length by each 357 researcher. Additionally, tables highlighting the case firms' evolution, and an overview table of the five 358 antecedents were created to enrich the case protocols. 359
We sought to create a profile of each case firm's internal environment for CE using the 360 techniques described by Zellweger and Sieger (2012) . Firstly, each researcher independently evaluated 361 the levels of the internal antecedents at the point of investigation using a nine-point scale ranging from 1 362 (low) to 9 (high). To avoid over specification, we formed three rating categories: low (rating 1-3), 363 medium (rating 4-6), and high (rating 7-9), allowing each researcher to develop a graphical illustration of 364 the five internal antecedents for CE in each case (see Figure 1 ). Subsequently, a rating in any one of the 365 antecedents not only suggests the need for the development of such activities to enhance the firm's 366 readiness for CE, but also that the case firms' experienced difficulties in applying the particular 367
antecedent. 368
Next, the two researchers met, compared their independent findings and profiles of the case firms, 369 and discussed any discrepancies. Overall, the two researchers were able to agree upon a single profile for 370 each case as there was little disagreement among the independent examinations. Finally, both researchers 371 also considered possible shortcomings and extensions of the existing conceptualization of the antecedents, 372 resulting in a refined conceptualization located in the context of emerging economy SMEs. 373
ANTECEDENTS OF CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN KENYAN SMEs 379
Analysis of case data showed that a supportive organizational climate is a crucial aspect of 380 entrepreneurial SME firms in emerging economies. However, our data indicates that our case firms 381 perceived and successfully implemented only two of the five established antecedents of CE; namely top 382 management support and organizational boundaries. In contrast to the prevailing view in the CE literature, 383 our case firms faced obstacles and hurdles to accommodating rewards/reinforcement, work 384 discretion/autonomy, and time availability in CE (de Villiers-Scheepers 2012; Sebora et al. 2010) . In 385 particular our cases show that the specific profiles of the antecedents associated with successful CE in 386 emerging economies and SMEs may also differ considerably from their Western and larger firm 387 counterparts. Moreover, our findings also demonstrate that cultural, contextual and resource availability 388 matter with respect to how managers can realistically put in place in an effort to spark CE. The following 389 section and Table 2 discusses these in more detail. 390
Top management support 394
Prior research in CE focusing on larger organizations has emphasized top management support in 395 facilitating and promoting entrepreneurial behavior through the creation of a pro-entrepreneurial 396 organizational environment and the provision of resources that people require to take entrepreneurial 397 actions (Hornsby et al. 2002; Ireland et al. 2009 ). The data from our cases largely supports this view for 398
SMEs in an emerging economy context. However, our data also reveals differences in how top 399 management supported CE in emerging SMEs from that of larger firms. In particular, the majority of our 400 interviewees indicated that formalized support mechanisms such as the allocation of financial and non-401 financial resources in support of new entrepreneurial efforts were either limited or non-existent. 402
Several managerial level respondents stressed that their firms generally took a long-term 403 approach to projects and hence resources were carefully planned in advance and committed to such 404 projects only after much due diligence had taken place. Moreover, both the R&D manager of SafePack 405
and CIO of InfoComm admitted that in an emerging economy like Kenya, procuring resources, especially 406 financial resources from the market was extremely difficult and hence their firms had to employ a 407 'conservative and cautious approach' to managing their firms' current resources stocks. Similarly 408
GoodSell's project manager stated, 'We need to constantly think of the long term goals of the company. 409
They (management) look at the company's budget very tightly and are not in the habit of freely spending 410
it.' Hence, among our case firms, the careful and diligent use of resources is a matter of priority, and 411
long-term innovation is vulnerable compared to responses to short-term business pressures. Our findings 412
here further support that a firm's interest in entrepreneurial activities can be influenced by management's 413 perceptions of resource slack and availability and its willingness to make those available. Normally, this 414 would be thought to deprive entrepreneurship within the firm, yet these case firms are known for their 415 innovation and entrepreneurship. This implies that context is fundamental to making judgments about 416
CE. 417
Observations and discussion with the respondents also highlighted the importance of informal 418 mechanisms in support of entrepreneurial activity provided by top management. Both managerial and 419 non-managerial respondents alike consistently talked about the role played by top managers in identifying 420 and personally bringing to the owners' attention promising entrepreneurial initiatives. The findings above resonate with Western studies in that senior management often develop the 428 vision for entrepreneurship, which stimulates the engagement of others in similar pro-entrepreneurship 429 behavior (Ireland et al. 2009 ). Accordingly, we find that our case firms tend to exhibited moderate to high 430 levels of top management support for CE (see Figure 1) . But, our findings further suggest that such top 431 management support differs in important ways, especially with respect to exactly how they supported CE. 432
For instance, in contrast to earlier research, our findings suggest that in emerging economy SMEs, 433 financial and resource support can be limited, creating a much stronger competition for viable ideas only 434 to emerge to the surface. Our findings further highlight the importance of more informal mechanisms 435 such as espousing an entrepreneurial spirit or encouraging employee interactions in this respect. 436
Rewards/reinforcement 437
Numerous studies have stressed that CE can be encouraged in both large and small firms by the 438 use of organizational systems which clearly identify and recognize entrepreneurial activity (Carrier 1996; 439 Hornsby et al. 2002; 2013a) . In general, interviewees suggest that they were cognizant of how rewards 440 were linked to their own entrepreneurial efforts. However, in contrast to theoretical expectations, our 441 findings revealed that the majority of our case firms lacked specific organizational systems and processes 442 to recognize and reward entrepreneurial efforts. For instance, at SafePack and GoodSell, performance 443 reviews were done in an irregular and ad-hoc manner not linked to entrepreneurial outcomes at all. 444
Moreover, in instances where there were regular performance evaluations (KeTours and InfoComm), they 445 tended to overly emphasize more immediate and easily-observable organizational goals and employee 446 behaviors. As KeTours' Operations and Planning Manager pointed out, 'the annual review is overly 447 focused on making sure we stick to protocol and are achieving our efficiency targets'. 448
Interviews with respondents further identified that their interest in engaging in entrepreneurial 449 activity was further undermined by ambiguities in recognizing entrepreneurial efforts and ultimately who 450 would benefit from them. For instance, at SafePack, evaluations were rather ambiguous, and in the case of 451 GoodSell, cultural considerations were identified as affecting the assessors' discretion in determining 452 whether the employee was behaving entrepreneurially or not. Hence in both these cases, respondents 453 interviewed were found to be less engaged in CE related behaviors as compared to the other case firms. to aspiring and innovative employees. As such, the current crop of managers all rose to their current 475 positions as a result of this policy. Furthermore, interviews with respondents revealed that promotion 476 provided a sense of a job security in a country where there were generally limited opportunities and tough 477 working condition existed. Promotion also afforded employees the opportunity to work with and develop 478 closer relations with the firms' owners and senior managers, something that was noted as being highly 479 valued in the Kenyan culture. In African societies, small firms operate in a system of mutually benefiting 480 reciprocities (Khavul, Bruton, and Wood 2009) and having strong social ties between employees and 481 employer eventually leads to the development of trust and other benefits (Khavul, et al. 2009 ), which the 482 evidence here suggests may include entrepreneurship. 483
In considering the above evidence, we find that the current conceptualizations of CE regarding 484 rewards and reinforcement did not fit well with the experience of emerging economy SMEs. Accordingly, 485 our scoring of rewards and reinforcement was mostly low across our case firms (see Figure 1) where the value of promotion as a reward has been discredited (Carrier 1996) 495
Work discretion/autonomy 496
Prior research suggests that entrepreneurial outcomes arise from those that have latitude and 497 freedom from excessive oversight, enjoy some level of responsibility, and are not excessively penalized 498 for failure from experimentation (Hornsby et al. 2002) . However, our data suggested that respondents in 499 our case firms generally had little opportunity to exercise individual work discretion because of cultural 500 expectations and the general work environment. Our case analysis indicated that management's 501 expectations of their own behaviors in the workplace are central to how work discretion was ultimately 502 viewed and afforded to their subordinates. Amongst our case firms, there was a strong belief and 503 expectation among senior management in particular that they should take 'the lead' and 'be involved in 504 Informal discussions and observations with respondents further revealed that while some 514 preferred to have empowerment in their jobs, many still preferred to defer decision making to those 515 higher up the hierarchy. Interestingly, such preferences continued to prevail even though some of the 516 firms (KeTours, InfoComm and GoodSell) moved towards decentralized organizational structures and 517 changes to work structures and roles, designed to specifically increase individual autonomy. Our finding 518 here is consistent with existing studies that reveal how collectivist societies like Kenya are akin to 519 authoritarianism and in-group authority relationships (Kemmelmeier et al. 2003) . Our data also indicated 520 that deference to authority not only influenced individual employees' interest in engaging in innovative or 521 entrepreneurial activity, but also the case firms' ability to quickly identify and exploit entrepreneurial 522 opportunities in the market. For example, GoodSell had missed out on several opportunities to expand its 523 business domain into new areas, as the Sales Director felt it necessary to always confer with the founder 524
first. 525
With regards to tolerance of failure, few if any of the case firms were willing to tolerate failure 526 from entrepreneurial experimentation. In fact, the case evidence indicated that attitude towards tolerating 527 failure was strongly linked to very stringent cost-benefit or financial control systems embedded within 528 each firm. There was a general attitude among the case firms that failure is unacceptable and could lead to 529 a loss of face, not just for the employee but to the firm as a whole. GoodSell's project manager asserts 530 that, 'only the best ideas are supported because if you fail, you let a lot of people down.' Moreover, 531 because resources are limited, access to financial resources was reserved for only those projects that are 532 likely to succeed. Hence, there is little opportunity for experimentation and testing of new ideas. 533
Our findings here are line with those of van Wyk and Adonisi (2012) regarding the negative 534 effects of authoritarianism on CE in the African context. Our case evidence suggests a nuanced pattern of 535 work discretion wherein top-down decision making and stringent organizational processes limited the 536 individuals' entrepreneurial behaviors necessary for successful CE. From these findings, it seems that few 537 firms offer their key employees opportunities for work discretion and those that do seem to implant a very 538 stringent cost-benefit or financial control system. Such financial control systems are noted to have an 539 aggravating effect on CE (Barringer and Bluedorn 1999) . In considering the above evidence, we note that 540 the experiences of emerging economy SMEs with respect to affording employees work discretion for 541 entrepreneurial initiatives did not align well with our current conceptualization of the antecedent. Thus we 542 found that most of our case firms displayed mostly low levels of work discretion (see Figure 1) . 543 Moreover, our findings regarding how financial controls and cultural attitudes towards hierarchal 544 relationships hamper the case firms' CE, builds on to existing theoretical expectations. 545
Time availability 546
In contrast to the role that the CE literature assigns to time availability, our case firms provided 547 little slack time outside of non-essential tasks (Hornsby et al. 2002) . When asked during the interviews 548 whether they had time to work on entrepreneurial ideas in the last three months, almost all our 549 respondents voiced a strong desire to have more 'free time' to do so. When asked why their time for 550 entrepreneurial efforts was limited, our respondents identified a number of salient factors both within and 551 outside of their respective organizations that influenced their time availability. Externally, we note that 552 our case firms found themselves competing in highly dynamic and competitive environments. For 553 instance, KeTours operates in the highly emergent tourism sector in Kenya, and faces relentless 554 competition from both local and increasingly overseas competitors. Similarly both SafePack and 555
InfoComm are constantly striving to establish themselves in their respective markets. 556
In such situations, we found respondents to be particularly focused on salient tasks such as 557 meeting sales targets, building reputation and addressing customer needs as they were considered 558 necessary for competing in such markets. As such 'slack time' for entrepreneurial initiatives was 559 considered almost too valuable of a resource to be freely given. SafePack's Training Coordinator claimed 560
that, 'in small and rapidly growing firm, time to work on new ideas to improve systems and process is 561 largely limited because very little time available, as we were often required to focus on more pressing 562
issues'. Furthermore, we also note that in the cases of KeTours and InfoComm, lack of technological 563 availability and sophistication in the Kenyan marketplace also increased managers and employees time 564 spent on such tasks. 565
Two main issues emerged that appeared to affect respondents' time availability for 566 entrepreneurial activity, both of which have received little attention in the existing literature. First, 567 amongst three of our four case firms (KeTours, SafePack and InfoComm), there was a strong push by 568 management to become ISO9000-certified in order to remain competitive in their markets. However both 569 the CEOs of SafePack and InfoComm acknowledged that the pursuit of effectiveness and efficiency 570 through the certification process came at the expense of organizational innovativeness. As the CEO of 571
SafePack explained, 'at first we were mostly geared towards trying to be the innovative leader in our 572 market place, but now, our focus is much more production planning and technology planning.' 573
Consequently such changes have also had a trickledown effect on employees' time availability for 574 entrepreneurial efforts. For instance at KeTours and InfoComm, managers now spend a considerable 575 amount of their time on routine tasks and the documentation of procedures and processes as opposed to 576 working on more entrepreneurial initiatives. As the Chief Information Officer of InfoComm explains, 577
'with all these new process coming into place, compliance is a major issue….. by and large my job is just 578
to make sure things run smoothly as possible.' 579 Second, the role of human capital emerged as an important driver of innovative activities in these 580 firms, a notion supported by studies of SMEs (e.g., Alpkan et al. 2010 ). However, prior research has also 581 demonstrated that SMEs, particularly those from Africa, often face difficulty in acquiring the necessary 582 human capital resources, hence affecting their growth and development prospects (Smith and Watkins 583 2012) . Our data indicated a similar story. Across the board, our firms found it difficult to recruit quality 584 human resource among Kenyan graduates. Particularly lacking were graduates or employees with 585 entrepreneurial skills and competencies necessary to work in such fast growing and dynamic firms. As a 586 result, managers often found themselves being highly involved in overseeing the actions of employees. 587 
my team is doing. And that keeps me busy most of the time.' 591
In sum, our findings suggest that emerging economy SMEs experienced difficulties in providing 592 slack time for entrepreneurial activities by important groups of people across the firm, in ways that has 593 not been properly accounted for by the existing conceptualization of this antecedent. Our scoring of the 594 antecedent indicates low levels of time availability of entrepreneurial activities across the four case firms 595 (see Figure 1) . 596
Prior research has suggested a cascading effect with respect to time availability and 597 organizational positioning (Hornsby et al. 2009 ). However, our evidence indicates that in emerging 598 economy SMEs, despite their organizational positions and titles, many of the employees' job roles and 599 scopes still remain quite narrow. However, our findings do further highlight that a focus on efficiency and 600 multitasking can further undermine time availability for entrepreneurial initiatives and a further degree of 601 interaction among elements of the internal environment put in place by top managers which is hitherto not 602 well understood in the CE literature (Hornsby et al. 2009 ). Secondly, our findings highlight the 603 aggravating effects of skill deficiencies among human capital resources with respect to facilitating CE 604 through their effect on time availability and its subsequent use (Hayton and Kelly 2006) . Hence we 605 suggest that future conceptualizations of the time availability antecedent also take into consideration the 606 role played by the firm's quality and stock of human resources. 607
Organizational boundaries 608
Flexible organizational boundaries are useful in promoting entrepreneurial activity because they 609 enhance the flow of information between the external environment and the organization and between 610 departments/divisions within the organization (Miller, Fern, and Cardinal 2007) . Throughout our cases, 611
we noted efforts by the owners and top managers over the past five years to move away from their 612 existing centralized and silo organizational structures by moving towards more cross-functional team-613 based structures (KeTours and GoodSell) or specific project teams (InfoComm and SafePack). 614
Furthermore, our in-depth interviews revealed that such structural changes were also accompanied by 615 changes to organizational processes, designed to effectively identify and screen innovative ideas. For 616 instance, at SafePack, the CEO and top management implemented a new form for, and monthly review 617 process of, innovative suggestions (which may help mitigate the issue of time availability as well). 618
Similarly at InfoComm, employees had developed an idea generation system, which is reviewed every 619 three months where the best idea is selected and implemented. In general, our respondents indicated that 620 such changes to process were positive developments. Our finding here is consistent with other studies 621 promoting the role of information sharing and flexible organizational structures. 622
More importantly though, given the conceptual ambiguities surrounding the organizational 623 boundaries antecedent (Hornsby et al. 2013a ), our case findings shed new insights as to how 624 organizational boundaries facilitate CE. In particular, our case analysis highlights the importance of top 625 management in creating arenas for promoting interpersonal relationship and trust among employees, 626 teams and departments, which subsequently promote idea generation and ultimately CE. For example, at 627
InfoComm and GoodSell, senior management facilitated the coming together of individuals and teams in 628 order to formulate new ideas or devise new projects. However, in both these firms, such actions and 629 efforts were not undertaken as 'first moves' or initiatives but instead were reactions to disputes. conflict may play a relevant role in CE within the emerging economy SME context. Again, this is 643
hitherto not considered in the literature on CE. Thus, we add important insights into the current 644 conceptualization of organizational boundaries as an antecedent of CE. Our case evidence suggests that 645 top managers may assume the role of intrapreneurs themselves and purposefully act as builders of 646 networks or human interactions within their businesses, subsequently promoting CE through collective 647 entrepreneurship (Toledano, Urbano and Bernadich 2010) . This may be especially important in the 648 context of SMEs and emerging economy firms, because such close working relationships between 649 employees and management hold the potential to enhance levels of trust and communication between and 650 among these groups. Secondly, by shaping organizational boundaries, top managers' active involvement 651 in bringing people together regularly might be one way to compensate for the otherwise limited 652 availability of resource and time for entrepreneurial actions. 653
DISCUSSION AND CONTRIBUTIONS 654
In response to recent calls for research on what enables CE in emerging economy SMEs 655 (Hornsby et al. 2013b; Hoskisson et al. 2000; Phan et al. 2009 ) and comparable calls to action to examine 656 CE activity across different regions (Gómez-Haro et al. 2011; Hornsby et al. 2013a ) and contexts (Zahra 657 and Wright, 2011) , this paper makes three theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions. 658
As a theoretical contribution, our study shows that a supportive internal organizational 659 environment is as important for CE in SMEs in emerging economies as it is for their established Western 660 counterparts, but, and more importantly, our findings reveals that the manifestation of this internal 661 organizational environment is very different to the status quo presented in current theory. This provides 662 compelling evidence to support Zahra and Wright's (2011) claim that the reduction of context to a simple 663 control variable masks fundamental knowledge that is crucial to the advancement of theory across the 664 field of entrepreneurship. For example, our case firms exhibited only 2 of the 5 traditional antecedents of 665 CE, namely top management support and organizational boundaries. On the surface, this might suggest 666 that some of the established antecedents do replicate at the SME level and in the emerging economy 667 context. But this is not the case. Although our case firms provided top management support and 668 manipulated organizational boundaries to promote CE, they did so in ways that differed from treatments 669 reported in the literature so far (e.g., Hornsby et al. 2002 Hornsby et al. , 2013a Hornsby et al. , 2014 . They were executed differently 670 and contextualized to the circumstances of emerging economy SMEs. For top management support, 671 formalized support mechanisms for allocating financial and non-financial resources towards 672 entrepreneurial efforts were limited and managers conservatively and cautiously managed their firms' 673 resource stocks. Instead, managers oriented the allocation of resources towards entrepreneurial projects by 674 adopting a much longer term perspective and increasing the due diligence behind entrepreneurial 675 initiatives. Interestingly, these results are not consistent with studies of other emerging economies. Sebora 676 et al. (2010) found support for the more traditional characterization of top management support in Thai 677
SMEs, which suggests that regional institutional differences are more important than economic ones to 678 understand the motivation of CE. 679
These results also differ from studies of SMEs in Western economies. Frank et al. (2010) reported 680 that in difficult, dynamic environments, for firm entrepreneurial behavior to take place productively, high 681 access to financial capital is needed. Yet our Kenyan SMEs were vibrant and entrepreneurial despite 682 limited access to such resources. Moreover, informal support was also important in this context as for 683 non-managerial employees, top managers showed a willingness to rapidly bring the best ideas of their 684 other managerial and non-managerial employees to the attention of owners. Our findings extend those of 685 Castrogiovanni et al. (2011) . The personal relationships top managers hold with their employees is an 686 important form of non-resource support that motivates CE among our emerging economy service sector 687
SMEs. This shows a need for models of, and judgments about, CE to be far more culturally contextually 688 sensitive. Our findings enrich a context-sensitive analysis of the antecedents of CE (de Villiers-Scheepers 689 2012; Hornsby et al. 2013b; Phan et al. 2009; Zellweger and Sieger 2012) by providing a fine-grained 690 representation of top management support as an enabler of CE in emerging economy SMEs. 691
Of further interest is our finding about organizational boundaries as an antecedent of CE. These 692 raise important questions about how entrepreneurship in emerging economy SMEs might come about. We 693 found support for this antecedent but its execution was very different to expectations in the established 694 literature (e.g., Hornsby et al. 2002 Hornsby et al. , 2013a Hornsby et al. , 2014 , and it appears to be quite vulnerable to context 695 sensitivity. Historically, the notion of organizational boundaries has been presented as one of 696 entrepreneurial individuals spanning organizational boundaries to link disparate parts of the firm together, 697 sharing knowledge and enabling novel knowledge to emerge and new innovative ideas and initiatives to 698 germinate. In our case firms, individuals, teams and departments across the firms exhibited regular 699 quarrelling and were brought together across boundaries by top managers acting as brokers and 700 negotiators to bring people together. Thus, the whole process of germinating dialogue and new solutions 701 to emerge was orchestrated heavily. So far, this problem has not surfaced in investigations of the 702 antecedents of CE, but our findings resonate with prior concerns that a strongly collectivist environment 703 may give rise to anti-entrepreneurship sentiment and group performance to suffer from dysfunctional 704 syndromes (Jackson et al. 2008; Morris et al. 1994) . This is likely to be further exacerbated by the fact 705 that management philosophies in Kenya are dominated by sharp distinctions in status differences among 706 groups of employees across the firm (Kiggundu 1988) . We contribute an extension to the present 707 theoretical framework of CE antecedents by showing that boundary spanning behavior must be led by 708 managers first, and not left to employees alone as advocated in current theory. 709
These observations can also be further understood when considering our findings about work 710 discretion. Few opportunities for work discretion were granted outside of top management and top 711 managers themselves sought hands on involvement in projects with employees, and particularly in 712 decision-making. Taken with our observations about organizational boundaries, it is quite possible then 713 that individuals and teams simply did not consider autonomously crossing boundaries viable because of 714 the absence of, and some lack of desire for, absolute work discretion. Therefore, we enrich the body of 715 theory for examining CE by demonstrating the value of institutional and cultural lenses to understand 716 what enables CE in contexts for removed the traditional Western perspective. Individuals were not 717 mindful to adopt work discretion even when provided by top manager, contradicting the emphasis placed 718 on work discretion and autonomy in current theory (Hornsby et al. 2002; Lumpkin and Dess 1996) 719 Theoretical development in the field of CE will need to rely on institutional theory and contextual 720 analysis if we are to progress our knowledge about situationally-relevant antecedents and enablers. 721
Also apparent from our data were interactions among the antecedents of CE unforeseen in the 722 existing literature. For example, offering work discretion is compromised by the existence of strong 723 financial controls and stringent cost-benefit regimes while time availability is rare. Also, work discretion 724 was rebalanced by top managers purposefully crossing organizational boundaries to resolve problems 725 caused by quarrelling teams. This illustration paints a different image of the use of organizational 726 boundaries as a means of stimulating CE by reducing information-seeking time, reducing costs, 727 overcoming the limitations of time unavailability, and increasing confidence in top management support 728 for entrepreneurial initiatives. Such complicated interactions have yet to be modelled in current 729 frameworks of CE. These findings reveal that a black box between antecedent conditions and CE 730
outcomes that is at least in part a function of emerging economy SMEs context. 731
As an empirical contribution, we observe that for employees, entrepreneurship within the context 732 of the job and securing promotion coupled with a close relationship with supportive and active top 733 managers sets the context for CE to take place, even in what might otherwise appear as unproductive 734 conditions in more traditional contexts. For example, while employees were cognizant of how rewards 735 were linked to their entrepreneurial efforts, promotion and non-financial rewards such as recognition for a 736 job done well were most valued, and employees respected the need for compliance behavior. Ideas of 737 compliance and deference are orthogonal to our knowledge of what entrepreneurship in SMEs requires, 738
and we add empirical evidence to a group of studies that collectively reveal the problems of deference to 739 authority (e.g., Beugré and Offodile 2001; Jackson et al. 2008; Kamoche 2011; van Wyk and Adonisi 740 2012) . In our case firms, that deference to authority even overruled a cultural expectation of obedience of 741 managerial instructions. Thus, even when granted autonomy and asked to engage in entrepreneurship, 742 deference to authority suppressed them from taking up of those initiatives. This new empirical 743 contribution raises further questions about the theoretical and practical accuracy of current frameworks. 744
Of further interest are our more fine-grained observations about rewards and reinforcement. We 745 find that rewards for entrepreneurial actions can be undermined by signals caused by the outcomes of 746 reward systems (e.g., promotions encouraging job security diminished a sense of need to take 747 entrepreneurial risks). Our data suggested that individuals within the case firms were analytical and 748 reflective in deciding how they behaved in their work. They tended to be less spontaneous in their 749 behavior and less willing to take risks unless it protected their job, and this behavior was hardened by the 750 tendency among the firms to use rewards/reinforcements systems that emphasized job security. Studies 751 have long been of the view that Kenyan employees assign the highest importance to security needs (Blunt 752 and Jones 1986) but we observe empirically that the reticence to entrepreneurship this causes can be 753 overcome by promotion and recognition from managers and peers being provided as rewards for 754 entrepreneurship. Doing so converts the desire for security away from one of restrained behavior to one of 755 entrepreneurship when aligned to such non-financial rewards. Considering the role of SMEs in raising 756 quality of life in emerging economies, these findings lend support to Bruton, Alsthrom and Si's (2015) 757 call for poverty alleviating mechanisms that go beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. The study 758 highlights the role of institutional actions (George, Nicholson, Corbishley & Bansal, 2014) and conditions 759 necessary for CE. By improving internal conditions, employees are more likely to simply work to survive 760 and in fact are more willing innovate and create new opportunities for growth. In more practical terms we 761 see an emerging connection to improvements in the way firms do business and their potential effect on 762 improving living standards in developing economies. 763
Finally, we make a small methodological contribution. In the spirit of Zahra et al. (1999) , the use 764 of a qualitative methodology helped us generate a much better understanding of the 'how' and 'why' of 765 CE in the context of emerging economy SMEs, where knowledge (both theoretical and empirical) 766 remains thin. Using a qualitative methodology over the more traditional quantitative approach in 767 assessing the internal antecedents for CE allows us to overcome problems associated with single-768 respondent research and the de-contextualization of CE in prior studies. Studies wishing to examine well-769 established concepts and instruments in different contexts such as emerging economies can use our 770 protocols to develop more context-sensitive treatments of CE in future. 771
Drawing this discussion together, we offer a revised and extended theoretical framework of the 772 antecedents of CE that can serve small business researchers interested in advancing the field towards a 773 greater appreciation of CE in emerging economies and service sector SMEs therein. This extended 774 theoretical framework is illustrated in Figure 2 . Our findings speak to managers and policy-makers who 775 work closely with emerging economy SMEs. Such individuals need to be cautious of adopting and 776 recommending CE frameworks and practices developed in studies of firms within developed economies, 777
and should be more mindful of how entrepreneurial processes and practices may be influenced by context. 778
Our work offers a basis to resolve this problem. 779
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 783
Our study is not without limitations. First, adopting a qualitative methodology constrains the 784 generalizability of our findings to the theoretical and analytical alone. Our selection of cases sits within 785 the Kenyan service sector SMEs. Our observations might be less relevant to non-service sector SMEs, 786 larger more established firms, and firms from different institutional contexts. However, we note that we 787 did not seek to generalize our findings to these audiences. Instead, we sought to give rich contextualized 788 insights into how the specific antecedents for CE are manifested in emerging economy SMEs. 789 Second, our study is appropriately qualitative in nature given inconsistencies and questions we 790 raised and reported in our literature review on the relevance of the five repeatedly-emphasized 791 antecedents of CE to non-traditional contexts. We also appropriately noted our concern that the 792 dominance of quantitative methodologies in the research into the antecedents of CE has ushered in a de-793 contextualization of the antecedents of CE that is clearly problematic based on our qualitative findings. 794
Still, a mixed methods approach could have enabled us to provide a larger set of data from which to study 795 the emerging relationships drawn from our qualitative findings. Future research may wish to adopt such 796 an approach to studying CE in non-traditional contexts. 797
Finally, our study focused only on a direct set of established internal antecedents to CE and 798 searched for anomalies and (in)consistencies within that remit. Studies with a broader scope then ours 799 may consider external and environmental antecedent as well (Frank et al. 2010) . Such an approach has the 800 potential to offer small business researchers a theoretical framework in advancing the field towards 801 greater appreciation of the antecedents of CE in non-traditional contexts. 802
Our study leaves a number of questions worthy of further investigation. First, the limited research 803 body of knowledge on CE among emerging economy firms (Hornsby et al. 2013a ) remains a concern. 804 Future research may do well to extend this study into other emerging economies and diverse 805 organizational contexts such as larger established firms. Second, our findings suggest that the antecedents 806 of CE established in the literature are subject to context sensitivity in complex ways. Such a theoretical 807 omission represents a problem in present treatments of CE based on our findings. While our paper offers a 808 contribution in carving out deviations from the CEAI model, it implies that a set of hitherto unforeseen 809 and undiscovered mediators and moderators acting on how a firm might organize effectively for CE likely 810 exist. Appreciating how CE is achieved and practiced among emerging economy firms affords scholars 811 the opportunity to develop better theories and conceptual models of CE and managers to arrive at better 812 customized prescriptions to improve the competitiveness of their firms. 813
Finally, we urge future research studies to consider how the institutional environment influences 814 the adoption of CE initiatives among emerging economy firms. Earlier, Gómez-Haro et al. (2011) drew 815 scholarly attention to the important influence of both the formal and informal environments on firm-level 816 entrepreneurial activities. We urge future researchers to consider how the external environmental 817 (whether formal or informal) may influence the adoption and implementation of the internal antecedents 818 for CE. Such an approach offers a premise for the development of theoretical frameworks that can further 819 serve small business researchers who are interested in advancing the field towards a greater appreciation 820 of the antecedents of CE efforts and enlarge our understanding of how SMEs can become more 821 competitive in emerging economies 822
CONCLUSION 823
The central question guiding this study was whether the current conceptualization of the five 824 antecedents of a supportive internal environment for CE remains applicable and relevant in the context of 825 SMEs in an emerging economy. Drawing on the Kenyan service sector SMEs as our empirical starting 826 point, our findings reveal that institutional and cultural variations as well as context-specific features 827 within the Kenyan service sector SME landscape and workplace shaped how CE needed to be organized 828 in these firms. We contribute both theoretically and empirically to the existing literature by suggesting 829 that the organization of Kenyan SMEs' internal environments for CE is much more nuanced, interactive, 830 and complex than currently presented in Western treatments and studies. The findings contained within 831 this study offer an insightful basis on which to further examine how context impinges on entrepreneurial 832 actions in firms outside of the traditional Western context and extend the theoretical framework of the 833 antecedents of CE. 834 
Business History and CE Activities
Initially started as small regional airline. Rapid expansion over the past 6 years, with a number of innovative business practices developed internally. First regional airline to use internet bookings and payment system. More recent innovative activities have been based around developing high quality products, specialized tours Started as a small real estate firm in the late 1980's. Company has grown rapidly since then and branched out into a number of allied areas, such as property management and online retailing. Recently new innovative practices have emerged which has enabled the company to develop its own online portal, and introduction of financing options for customers and making them the premier online trading company in Kenya.
The company was mainly founded from the efforts of its owner, who previously was working for large oil MNC in Kenya. The main activity was based around providing health and safety equipment to oil and gas companies. More recently as result of CE activities, company has designed their own products and expanded to develop and deliver their own OHS programs for corporate and government clients. The company has also moved into sales and distribution of such product Business originally founded to provide IT solutions to existing companies. Since 2007 firm has engaged in a number of new projects based on developing and commercializing new software specifically for the East African market. Original business line also expanded designed to offer permanent assistance for clients. Latest CE project involve rebranding and change to organizational structure which resulted in winning lucrative government contract. 
